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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (1999). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue 1: Did the trial court err by arithmetically miscalculating the Plaintiffs 
damages? 
This issue was preserved in the trial court by the filing of Defendants' Notice of 
Objections to Proposed Judgment. (R. 289-90.) 
Standard of Review: This issue presents a question of law to be reviewed for 
correctness. See, e.g., Archuleta v. Hughes, 969 P.2d 409 (Utah 1998); Hebertson v. 
Willowcreek Plaza, 923 P.2d 1389 (Utah 1996). When reviewing legal determinations, 
an "appellate court decides the matter for itself and does not defer in any degree to the 
trial judge's determination of the law." State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
Issue 2: Did the trial court err by improperly awarding prejudgment interest on the 
Plaintiffs damages? 
This issue was preserved in the trial court by the filing of Defendants' Notice of 
Objections to Proposed Judgment. (R. 288-90.) 
Standard of Review: The award of prejudgment interest is a question of law to be 
reviewed for correctness. Klinger v. Kightly, 889 P.2d 1372, 1381 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
When reviewing legal determinations, an "appellate court decides the matter for itself and 
does not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of the law." State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
DETERMINATIVE RULES AND STATUTES 
Issue 1. The pertinent statutory provisions governing the award of damages for a 
seller's breach, as occurred in this case, appear at Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-2-711, -713, -
715 (1999). (Set forth verbatim in Addendum 1). 
Issue 2. The pertinent statutory provisions governing the propriety of awarding 
prejudgment interest appear at Utah Code Ann. §§ 15-1-1 and -4 (1999), set forth 
verbatim as follows: 
15-1-1. Interest rates - Contracted rate - Legal rate. 
(1) The parties to a lawful contract may agree upon 
any rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, 
goods, or chose in action that is the subject of their contract. 
(2) Unless parties to a lawful contract specify a 
different rate of interest, the legal rate of interest for the loan 
or forbearance of any money, goods, or chose in action shall 
be 10% per annum. 
(3) Nothing in this section may be construed in any 
way to affect any penalty or interest charge that by law 
applies to delinquent or other taxes or to any contract or 
obligations made before May 14, 1981. 
15-1-4. Interest on judgments. 
(1) As used in this section, "federal postjudgment 
interest rate" means the interest rate established for the federal 
court system under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1961, as amended. 
(2) Any judgment rendered on a lawful contract shall 
conform to the contract and shall bear the interest agreed upon 
by the parties, which shall be specified in the judgment. 
(3) (a) Except as otherwise provided by law, other 
civil and criminal judgments of the district court and 
349524 2 
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justice court shall bear interest at the federal 
postjudgment interest rate as of January 1 of each year, 
plus 2%. 
(b) The postjudgment interest rate in effect at 
the time of the judgment shall remain the interest rate 
for the duration of the judgment. 
(c) The interest on criminal judgments shall be 
calculated on the total amount of the judgment. 
Utah case law interpreting the statutory provisions is more relevant. See, e.g., 
Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379 (Utah 1995), Fell v. Union Pac. Ry. Co., 88 P. 1003 
(Utah 1907), Klinger v. Kightly, 889 P.2d 1372 (Utah Ct. App. 1995), Price-Orem Inv. 
Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 784 P.2d 475 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF THE CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT. 
Defendants appeal from the trial court's Judgment, dated October 13, 1999, 
entered after trial, awarding plaintiff Keith M. Jonsson the sum of $46,400, plus 
prejudgment interest in the amount of $13,533, and costs in the amount of $600, for a 
total Judgment of $60,533 plus postjudgment interest. 
This is an appeal of two discrete components of the calculation of the judgment 
entered by the trial court in this case. Defendants do not otherwise contest the trial 
court's judgment. 
B. STATEMENT OF FACTS. 
In 1996, Mr. Jonsson contracted with Mr. Bromley for the purchase of certain used 
electrical equipment, including a generator and a power switching unit. (R. 302.) Mr. 
T/ IO<*M ^ 
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Jonsson paid the contract price in full but did not take delivery. (R. 300.) Mr. Bromley 
then breached their contract by selling and delivering the generator to a third party. (R. 
298.) 
Mr. Jonsson sued Mr. Bromley to recover the benefit of his bargain. (R. 9.) At 
trial Mr. Jonsson's two experts testified to disparate values for the electrical equipment. 
(R. 353 at 28:4, 111:20-21.) The trial court found a mid-range value for the equipment 
and, over the defendant's objections, entered its judgment. (R. 290, 306.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
ARGUMENT I: The trial court arithmetically miscalculated Mr. Jonsson's 
damages. The formula for calculating damages in this contract dispute is, as the trial 
court correctly concluded, (i) the contract price, plus (ii) the difference between market 
value and contract price, plus (iii) the incidental and consequential damages. The trial 
court found (i) the contract price to be $5,900, (ii) the market value to be $38,000, and 
(iii) the incidental and consequential damages to be $2,500. When the trial court's own 
figures are plugged into its own formula, the result is $40,500. Regrettably, instead of 
using the difference between market value and contract price as the second figure in its 
formula, the trial court used market value alone. Not recognizing its arithmetic error, the 
trial court concluded that Mr. Jonsson's damages were $46,400. The trial court's award 
of damages was incorrect, and it should be reduced by $5,900. Furthermore, the trial 
349524 2 
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court's award of prejudgment interest, if it stands at all, should be reduced 
commensurately, for it is based on an incorrect calculation of damages. 
ARGUMENT II: The trial court improperly awarded Mr. Jonsson prejudgment 
interest. Prejudgment interest is only appropriate when damages are complete, 
determinable before trial, and calculable with mathematical certainty according to fixed 
rules of evidence and known standards of value. In this case, the plaintiffs own expert 
testimony suggested a range of possible values—from $24,000 to $35,000—for the 
generator. With nothing else to guide it, the trial court simply exercised its discretion and 
concluded that the market value of the generator was $30,000. The damages were based 
on the trial court's best judgment, rather than a sum calculable with mathematical 
certainty. In these circumstances the law in Utah is clear. The trial court's award of 
prejudgment interest should not stand. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ARITHMETICALLY MISCALCULATED THE 
PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES. 
The appropriate measure of damages for a frustrated purchaser of goods in Utah, 
and for this case, is: (i) recovery of so much of the price as has been paid, plus (ii) the 
difference between the market price and the contract price, together with (iii) any 
incidental and consequential damages. Utah Code Ann. §§ 70A-2-711, -713, -715 
(1999). The trial court correctly stated this UCC formula in both its Memorandum 
349524 2 
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Decision and its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. (R. 269-70, 292-93.) 
However, the trial court neglected to calculate the difference between the market value 
and contract price as required by the formula, but instead used the full market value of the 
goods in its application of the formula. The trial court's award is excessive, and it must 
be reduced to account for the difference. 
The trial court found that the price paid under the contract in this case was $5,900, 
and that the plaintiffs incidental and consequential damages totaled $2,500. (R. 295-96.) 
However, the trial court also determined that "the difference between market value and 
contract price for the goods that Mr. Jonsson did not receive is $38,000." (R. 295-96.) 
To reach this figure, the court merely added the market value of the generator ($30,000) 
and the market value of the switching unit ($8,000). The court failed to subtract the 
contract price ($5,900) from the total market value ($38,000). The court failed to 
calculate correctly the difference between the market value and the contract price. The 
figure that correctly represents the difference between the market value and the contract 
price is $32,100, the difference between $38,000 and $5,900. 
The proper calculation of damages is $40,500. This is the sum of (i) the contract 
price of $5,900, (ii) the difference between the market price and the contract price, 
$32,100 ($38,000 - $5,900), and (iii) the incidental and consequential damages of $2,500. 
The trial court, however, mistakenly awarded $46,400 in damages. The arithmetic error 
in the trial court's computation of damages is $5,900 ($46,400 - 40,500). 
349524 2 
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Finally, even if prejudgment interest is allowed in these circumstances (which it 
should not be, as explained below), the trial court's error in computing the damages led it 
to err in computing prejudgment interest. Ten percent simple interest, as prescribed by 
Utah Code Ann. § 15-1-1(2), on a judgment of $40,500 is $11,812. The court awarded 
prejudgment interest of $13,533 based on its arithmetically inaccurate award of damages 
in the amount of $46,400. The error is $1,721. If not eliminated entirely, prejudgment 
interest should be reduced to $11,812 ($13,533 - $1,721) to conform with the correct 
computation of damages. 
Defendants respectfully request that this Court modify the trial court's final 
judgment to remedy the errors in its computation of damages. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT IMPROPERLY AWARDED PREJUDGMENT 
INTEREST ON THE PLAINTIFF'S DAMAGES. 
Under longstanding Utah law, a party's loss must be complete, fixed as of a 
particular time, and calculable according to "fixed rules of evidence and known standards 
of value," before a trial court may award prejudgment interest on damages. Fell v. Union 
Pac. Ry. Co., 88 P. 1003, 1007 (Utah 1907). If the court or jury is "guided by their best 
judgment in assessing the amount" of the loss, and must exercise discretion to determine 
the total damages, prejudgment interest should not be allowed. 1 Id, 
* This longstanding rule governs an award of prejudgment interest regardless of whether 
the action sounds in contract or tort. What matters is how easily and clearly the damages 
can be calculated, not the nature of the claim itself. Fell, 88 P. at 1007. 
349524 2 
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According to the plaintiffs witnesses, there was a range of market values for the 
used generator in question. One of the plaintiffs witnesses, Mr. Richard Mitchell, 
testified that the generator might be worth "$23,000 or $24,000." (R. 353 at 28:4.) Mr. 
James Yates, another witness for the plaintiff, testified that he would "be selling it for 
somewhere between $25,000 and $35,000." (R. 353 at 111:20-21.) With nothing else to 
guide it, the court exercised its discretion as follows: "the Court determines the market 
value of the generator to be $30,000." (R. 295-96.) 
As the court's Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law make plain, the final 
determination of the used generator's market value, while based on expert testimony, was 
a mathematically uncertain amount that was not measurable by fixed standards of value. 
The damages awarded in this case were the product of the court's best judgment. 
Defendants are not appealing the trial court's finding with respect to valuation, only its 
award of prejudgment interest thereon. 
The Utah Supreme Court has consistently refused to award prejudgment interest in 
breach of contract cases when the loss cannot be measured with mathematical certainty or 
by "facts and figures," but rather is determined by the exercise of judgment and 
discretion. Cornia v. Wilcox, 898 P.2d 1379, 1387 (Utah 1995). In Cornia, the plaintiffs 
experts provided a range of values for the market price of cattle and the jury had to "use 
its best judgment in ascertaining and assessing the damages." Id. The Utah Supreme 
Court affirmed the trial court's denial of prejudgment interest because the market price of 
the cattle could not be determined until the jury exercised its discretion in calculating 
8 
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damages. Id. at 1386-87. Where inconsistent evidence of market value requires the 
finder of fact to apply its best judgment, this Court does not allow prejudgment interest. 
Indeed, this Court has consistently reversed trial courts' awards of prejudgment 
interest when market value cannot be determined with mathematical certainty on the basis 
of an expert witness's "imprecise testimony." Klinger v. Kightly, 889 P.2d 1372, 1381 
(Utah Ct. App. 1995). In Klinger, the measure of damages was the present market value 
of the property, plus closing costs, less the contract price. Id. at 1380. The plaintiffs' 
witness provided a range of possible values, from $3,000 to $10,000, and the trial court 
decided that the market value of the property was $6,000. Citing Price-Orem Inv. Co. v. 
Rollins, Brown & Gunnell, Inc., 784 P.2d 475 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), which states that 
"damages ascertained by determining the fair market value of real property. . . 'cannot be 
determined with mathematical precision, [and] may be inherently uncertain,' " Id. at 483 
(quoting Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316, 1325 (Wyo. 1984)), this Court found that 
"the amount fixed by the trial court was calculated with mathematical inaccuracy and was 
inherently uncertain." This Court then overturned the trial court's award of prejudgment 
interest. 
The Klinger case is ultimately the same as this case. In both cases, the plaintiffs' 
witnesses failed to provide a mathematically calculable market value, and the trial court 
had to select a value near the middle. In both cases, the courts had to exercise their best 
judgment and discretion. As it did in Klinger, this Court should reverse the trial court's 
award of prejudgment interest in this case. 
9 
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This Court has repeatedly upheld trial courts' denials of prejudgment interest when 
the damages were based on market value, could not be ascertained with mathematical 
certainty, and required the fact finder to exercise its best judgment to calculate the loss. 
See, e.g., Smith v. Linmar Energy Corp., 790 P.2d 1222, 1226 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) 
(where the fair market value of crops was "not ascertainable in accordance with fixed 
rules of evidence and known standards of value," and damages were "the type . . . which 
are not easily calculated and must be ascertained by the general judgment of the fact 
finder at the time of trial," prejudgment interest is inappropriate); Price-Orem, 784 P.2d at 
483 (where the measure of damages was the difference between market value of real 
property before and after injury, and the expert appraisal was based on known standards 
of value and "facts and figures," the amount of damages was still too speculative to allow 
prejudgment interest). 
Awarding prejudgment interest promotes the policy of compensating injured 
parties for the time value of their losses due to the opposing party's failure to tender its 
obligation, and also deters intentional withholding of a sum certain due under an 
obligation. See Castillo v. Atlanta Cas. Co., 939 P.2d 1204, 1212 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). 
If the amount owed under an obligation cannot be calculated with precision and according 
to known standards of value before trial, then the amount cannot be tendered until the fact 
finder determines it. If the amount is not fixed until trial, then the breaching party must 
await the fact finder's determination before tendering what is owed, and it is improper to 
award prejudgment interest on that sum. 
10 
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In the case at hand, the trial court chose to fix the market value of the used 
generator at the mean value of the range of estimates provided by plaintiffs witnesses. 
Its decision was an independent assessment of the evidence; the amount of damages was 
based on the trial court's subjective standards of value, and it could not have been 
calculated before trial. The award in this case runs counter to the policy of denying 
prejudgment interest on damages that cannot be calculated before trial, and it should be 
removed from the judgment. 
Consistent with the policy, Utah law will allow an award of prejudgment interest 
in appropriate cases on contract claims, but only where those claims present losses that 
are fixed as of a particular time, easily calculated, and measurable according to known 
standards of value. For example, in Bjork v. April Indus., Inc., 560 P.2d 315, 316-17 
(Utah 1977), the measure of damages was the highest price of securities during a public 
offering less the stock's then-current value. The Court determined that the plaintiffs' loss 
in value was easily measured by "facts and figures" and did not require the fact finder to 
exercise its best judgment; thus, prejudgment interest was appropriate. Unlike the case at 
hand, the court in Bjork was able to rely on accurate and undisputed evidence of market 
value and damages that were complete and fixed as of a specific time. 
In another breach of contract case where the Court awarded prejudgment interest, 
Jack B. Parson Constr. Co. v. State, 552 P.2d 107, 108-09 (Utah 1976), the contract itself 
provided the calculation of damages. The amount of damages "was ascertainable by 
calculation and it was only the method to be used in making the calculation that was 
11 
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uncertain." Id. at 109. Thus, the damages were not subject to dispute as to value, 
certainty, or calculation, and the Court properly affirmed the trial court's award of 
prejudgment interest. See also Jorgensen v. John Clay & Co., 660 P.2d 229, 233 (Utah 
1983) (where the measure of damages was difference between contract price and price 
received when sheep were actually sold at the then-current market price and there was no 
evidence of a dispute over market values, the damages were calculable with 
mathematically accuracy and an award of prejudgment interest was proper); Anderson v. 
State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 583 P.2d 101, 104 (Utah 1978) (where the value of lost 
property was determined by undisputed opinion testimony, the loss was fixed as of a 
particular time, the amount of loss was calculable with mathematical accuracy, and 
prejudgment interest was proper).2 
In those cases where damages can be ascertained objectively, an award of 
prejudgment interest is appropriate. But where damages can only be ascertained 
subjectively, through the application of judgment and the exercise of discretion, such an 
award is incorrect. In this case, the award of prejudgment interest was incorrect. 
2 This Court will add prejudgment interest to a trial court's judgment only when the 
market value of the loss is clearly determined by the testimony of an expert witness, not 
the discretionary judgment of the trial judge. Castillo, 939 P.2d at 1206. The decision in 
Castillo furthers the policy of compensating the injured party for a delay in payment that 
could be measured by facts and figures before trial. The decision lies in contrast to the 
case at hand, where the trial judge chose to weigh the opinions of others and then apply 
his own best judgment in determining the market value of the loss. Thus, Mr. Bromley 
could not have known before trial what amount he owed after his breach, and should not 
be punished for not paying when the amount was not ascertainable or calculable. 
349524 2 
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CONCLUSION 
The trial court arithmetically miscalculated the plaintiffs damages. The court's 
error was compounded when it awarded prejudgment interest on an excessive judgment. 
Prejudgment interest should not have been awarded at all. Prejudgment interest is not 
allowed, under Utah law, where the judgment is the result of the trial court's exercise of 
discretion. The judgment in this case is the result of arithmetic miscalculation and the 
exercise of discretion. The trial court's total Judgment was $60,533. Defendant 
respectfully requests that this Court reduce the damages to $40,500, remove the 
prejudgment interest award of $13,533, and award Plaintiff a total Judgment of $41,100. 
DATED this ( day of August, 2000. 
J. THOMAS BECKETT 
ELLEN KITZMILLER 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Appellants 
349524 2 
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70A-2-711 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1096 
70A-2-711. Buyer's remedies in general — Buyer's se-
curity interest in rejected goods. 
(1) Where the seller fails to make delivery or repudiates or 
the buyer rightfully rejects or justifiably revokes acceptance 
then with respect to any goods involved, and with respect to 
the whole if the breach goes to the whole contract (Section 
70A-2-612), the buyer may cancel and whether or not he has 
done so may in addition to recovering so much of the price as 
has been paid 
(a) "cover" and have damages under the next section as 
to all the goods affected whether or not they have been 
identified to the contract, or 
(b) recover damages for nondelivery as provided in this 
chapter (Section 70A-2-713) 
(2) Where the seller fails to deliver or repudiates the buyer 
may also 
(a) if the goods have been identified recover them as 
provided in this chapter (Section 70A-2-502), or 
(b) in a proper case obtain specific performance or 
replevy the goods as provided in this chapter (Section 
70A-2-716) 
(3) On rightful rejection or justifiable revocation of accep-
tance a buyer has a security interest in goods in his possession 
or control for any payments made on their price and any 
expenses reasonably incurred in their inspection, receipt, 
transportation, care and custody and may hold such goods and 
resell them in like manner as an aggrieved seller (Section 
70A-2-706) 1965 
70A-2-712. "Cover" — Buyer's procurement of substi-
tute goods. 
(1) After a breach withm the preceding section the buyer 
may "cover" by making in good faith and without unreason-
able delay any reasonable purchase of or contract to purchase 
goods m substitution for those due from the seller 
(2) The buyer may recover from the seller as damages th§ 
difference between the cost of cover and the contract pries 
together with any incidental or consequential damages as 
hereinafter defined (Section 70A-2-715), but less expenses 
saved in consequence of the seller's breach 
(3) Failure of the buyer to effect cover within this section 
does not bar him from any other remedy 1965 
70A-2-713. Buyer's damages for nondel ivery or repu-
diation. 
(1) Subject to the provisions of this chapter with respect to 
proof of market price (Section 70A-2-723), the measure of 
damages for nondelivery or repudiation by the seller is th$ 
difference between the market price at the time when th$ 
buyer learned of the breach and the contract price together 
with any incidental and consequential damages provided in. 
this chapter (Section 70A-2-715), but less expenses saved in. 
consequence of the seller's breach 
(2) Market price is to be determined as of the place for 
tender or, in cases of rejection after arrival or revocation of 
acceptance, as of the place of arrival 1965 
70A-2-714. Buyer's damages for breach in regard to 
accepted goods . 
(1) Where the buyer has accepted goods and given notifica-
tion (Subsection (3) of Section 70A-2-607) he may recover as 
damages for any nonconformity of tender the loss resulting in 
the ordinary course of events from the seller's breach as 
determined in any manner which is reasonable 
(2) The measure of damages for breach of warranty is the 
difference at the time and place of acceptance between the; 
value of the goods accepted and the value they would have had 
if they had been as warranted, unless special circumstances 
show proximate damages of a different amount 
(3) In a proper case any incidental and consequential d 
ages under the next section may also be recovered m* 
1965 
70A-2-715. Buyer's incidental and consequential d 
ages . 
(1) Incidental damages resulting from the seller's bre K 
include expenses reasonably incurred in inspection recp 
transportation and care and custody of goods nghtfulh 
jected, any commercially reasonable charges, expenses 
commissions in connection with effecting cover and any nth 
reasonable expense incident to the delay or other breach 
(2) Consequential damages resulting from the seller' 
breach include 
(a) any loss resulting from general or particular re-
quirements and needs of which the seller at the time of 
contracting had reason to know and which could not 
reasonably be prevented by cover or otherwise, and 
(b) injury to person or property proximately resulting 
from any breach of warranty
 1965 
70A-2-716. Buyer's right to specific performance or 
replevin. 
(1) Specific performance may be decreed where the goods 
are unique or in other proper circumstances 
(2) The decree for specific performance may include such 
terms and conditions as to payment of the price, damages, or 
other relief as the court may deem just 
(3) The buyer has a right of replevin for goods identified to 
the contract if after reasonable effort he is unable to effect 
cover for such goods or the circumstances reasonably indicate 
that such effort will be unavailing or if the goods have been 
shipped under reservation and satisfaction of the security 
interest m them has been made or tendered 1965 
70A-2-717. Deduct ion of damages from the price. 
The buyer on notifying the seller of his intention to do so 
may deduct all or any part of the damages resulting from any 
breach of the contract from any part of the price still due 
under the same contract 1965 
70A-2-718. Liquidation or l imitation of damages — De-
posits . 
(1) Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in 
the agreement but only at an amount which is reasonable in 
the light of the anticipated or actual harm caused by the 
breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience 
or nonfeasibihty of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy A 
term fixing unreasonably large liquidated damages is void as 
a penalty 
(2) Where the seller justifiably withholds a delivery of goods 
because of the buyer's breach, the buyer is entitled to restitu-
tion of any amount by which the sum of his payments exceeds 
(a) the amount to which the seller is entitled by virtue 
of terms liquidating the seller's damages in accordance 
with Subsection (1), or 
(b) m the absence of such terms, twenty percent of the 
value of the total performance for which the buyer is 
obligated under the contract or $500, whichever is 
smaller 
(3) The buyer's right to restitution under Subsection (2) is 
subject to offset to the extent that the seller establishes 
(a) a right to recover damages under the provisions ot 
this chapter other than Subsection (1), and 
(b) the amount or value of any benefits received by the 
buyer directly or indirectly by reason of the contract 
(4) Where a seller has received payment in goods their 
reasonable value or the proceeds of their resale shall oe 
treated as payments for the purposes of Subsection (2), but I 
the seller has notice of the buyer's breach before reselling 
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h IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT^ (?) ' °f °\ fytfeputV 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH ^ 
KEITH JONSSON, 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
REED BROMLEY and BROMLEY FARMS, a 
Utah corporation, and UTAH VALLEY EGG & 
POULTRY, INC., a Utah corporation, 
Defendants. 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Case No. 970400247 
Judge Gary D. Stott 
This case came before the Court for trial on September 7, 1999 Both parties and their 
counsel were present at trial. The Court, having fully reviewed the file, and having thoroughly 
considered all of the evidence presented at trial, issues the following memorandum decision: 
Plaintiff Keith Jonsson offered Defendants Reed Bromley and Utah Valley Egg, Inc. a 
total of $8,000 for the purchase of their feed truck, generator, switching unit, electrical panels, 
and wiring. Douglas Powell conveyed Mr. Jonsson's offer to the Defendants on March 4, 1996 in 
the form of a written document that Mr. Jonsson had prepared. See Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. 
Reed Bromley testified in Court that he did not sign Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, but that instead 
Michael Bromley, Reed Bromley's father, signed his name on the document for him, believing at 
the time that Reed Bromley would not dispute the sale of the listed equipment. Reed Bromley 
accepted Mr. Jonsson's check for $8,000, depositing it the next day, and never told anyone 
connected to the transaction, including Keith Jonsson, Richard Mitchell (Mr. Jonsson's 
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electrician), Brandon Woods (Mr Mitchell's assistant electrician), or Steve Bell (representative of 
Utah Power and Light), that he disputed or was not in agreement with the document his father 
had signed 
Reed Bromley's also testified that he had not intended to sell the electrical panels and that 
he never would have agreed to sell them To support his position, he testified that he told Mr 
Powell, Mr Mitchell, Mr Woods, and Mr Bell, while such individuals were at his farm for the 
purpose of disconnecting and removing Mr Jonsson's equipment, that the electrical panels were 
not included in the deal with Mr Jonsson 
However, Mr Powell, Mr Mitchell, and Mr Woods' testimonies are consistent that Mr 
Bromley never mentioned to them that the electrical panels were to be excluded from what Mr 
Jonsson was buying Moreover, Bromley made no personal effort to contact Mr Jonsson to tell 
him that, despite the fact that he was accepting Mr Jonsson's offer and check, he was excluding 
the electrical panels from the sale The evidence shows that Bromley deposited the check in his 
own personal account and that he used the funds for his own personal or business needs 
Defendants have alleged that Mr Jonsson did not comply with the following contract 
clause "The generator will be picked up as soon as possible to be checked out by a qualified 
person " Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 Being advised of all the evidence presented at trial, the Court finds 
that Mr Jonsson, after receiving the signed document and after being notified that Reed Bromley 
had taken his check, acted reasonably and promptly in contacting Alvin Ault to go with him to 
personally inspect the equipment and in contacting Richard Mitchell to go to the farm to inspect 
the equipment and to disconnect and remove the equipment 
In late May or early June of 1996, Mr Jonsson sent Mr Mitchell to disconnect and pick 
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up all of the remaining items that Mr. Jonsson had purchased from the Bromley's farm. Mr. 
Woods and Mr. Bell were present with Mr. Mitchell during his visit to Bromley's farm to assist 
him in effecting a safe disconnection. During this visit, Reed Bromley was also present with Mr. 
Mitchell, Mr. Woods, and Mr. Bell at the farm. At Reed Bromley's request, the parties then 
agreed that the pick up of the items effected in the agreement, except feed truck, would be 
delayed. This agreement was evidenced by a telephone conversation which took place from the 
farm to Mr. Jonsson. The parties agreed to allow the items to remain in order to give Reed 
Bromley power to his shed, thus allowing him the opportunity to sell some egg processing 
equipment, and in order to avoid turning off a power source to the house where Michael Bromley, 
Reed Bromley's father, lived. The parties also agreed, per this phone conversation, that the 
equipment would be picked up and removed "before the snow flew." Reed Bromley admitted to 
having this agreement on the record. 
Based upon all of the testimony provided at trial, the Court finds that Mr. Jonsson made 
reasonable efforts to contact Reed Bromley to pick up the equipment. The Court finds no 
unreasonable delay on Mr. Jonsson's part in checking out the equipment by a qualified person or 
in making arrangements to have the equipment picked up. 
In light of all of the circumstances and the evidence surrounding the proposal of the 
agreement by Keith Jonsson to Reed Bromley, and considering Reed Bromley's actions in either 
signing the document or accepting the signature of his father on the document and accepting and 
depositing Mr. Jonsson's check for $8,000 without personally contacting Mr. Jonsson to inform 
him of any disagreement as to the electrical panels, the Court concludes that Mr. Jonsson met his 
burden of proof in establishing that he made an offer to purchase certain personal property, and 
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that Bromley ultimately accepted it, individually and on behalf of Utah Valley Egg Corporation, 
without repudiating, rescinding, or modifying the agreement as set forth in Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. 
There was a meeting of the minds and an understanding as to what was being sold and purchased, 
and there was an agreement to buy and sell the personal property as reflected in the written 
document, Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 is a binding document on the Plaintiff, Mr. 
Jonsson, to purchase and on the Defendants, Reed Bromley and Utah Valley Egg, Inc., to sell the 
items included in the document for the price indicated. 
n 
The Court finds that Defendants Reed Bromley, acting individually, and Reed Bromley, 
acting on behalf of Utah Valley Egg, Inc., breached their agreement with the Plaintiff, Mr. 
Jonsson. Reed Bromley falsely represented to Mr. Jonsson in October of 1996 that Michael 
Bromley had taken Mr. Jonsson's generator and switching unit to Salt Lake City to be serviced 
for Mr. Jonsson; however, Reed Bromley had actually sold the generator and switching unit to a 
third party. After Reed Bromley had given this false information about the generator to Mr. 
Jonsson, and after Mr. Jonsson discovered that Reed Bromley had sold the equipment, Mr. 
Jonsson acted reasonably and timely in determining the value of the property by finding out, at 
Reed Bromley's request, what it would cost to replace it, and in communicating such price to 
Reed Bromley. 
The Court finds that Bromley represented to Mr. Jonsson that if Mr. Jonsson would find 
out the replacement cost of the generator and the switching unit, he would replace such 
equipment, which he admitted he had wrongfully sold. However, testimony indicates that Reed 
Bromley would not speak with Mr. Jonsson after Mr. Jonsson informed him of the cost of 
4 
replacement. 
Considering all of the circumstances and the evidence surrounding the attempted pick up 
of the equipment by Mr. Jonsson, Reed Bromley's request that some equipment remain, Reed 
Bromley's misrepresentations to Mr. Jonsson, and Reed Bromley's sale of the equipment, which 
Mr. Jonsson had purchased, to a third party, the Court concludes that Defendants Reed Bromley 
and Utah Valley Egg & Poultry, Inc. breached their contract with the Plaintiff, Mr. Jonsson, as to 
the sale of goods indicated on Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, minus the feed truck, of which Mr. Jonsson 
has possession. 
m 
Defendants Reed Bromley and Utah Valley Egg and Poultry, Inc. are held jointly and 
severally liable for damages that Mr. Jonsson has suffered as a result of their breach. The Court 
finds that Defendant Reed Bromley acted both individually and on behalf of his corporation, Utah 
Valley Egg and Poultry, Inc., when he was dealing with Mr. Jonsson in this transaction. The 
contract is marked as Exhibit 1. Reed Bromley, as to the corporate entity of Utah Valley Egg, 
was its sole shareholder and its only officer. Reed Bromley held himself out individually to Mr. 
Jonsson and to Mr. Jonsson's agents to be the owner of the property until the filing of this 
lawsuit, after which he then claimed that Utah Valley Egg & Poultry, Inc. owned the property. 
There was no evidence at trial to indicate that Bromley Farms was a viable corporation when the 
parties entered the agreement. On the contrary, the evidence indicated that on March 4, 1996 
Bromley Farms was not the owner of the personal property involved in the transaction to Mr. 
Jonsson. The Court finds that Reed Bromley treated Utah Valley Egg and Poultry, Inc. as his alter 
ego. Thus, to correctly include the owners of the property, the court holds Reed Bromley and 
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Utah Valley Egg and Poultry, Inc. jointly and severally liable for damages in this case. 
IV 
Utah Code has specifically adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, in U.C.A. §§ 70A-1-
101 et seq, to govern the sale of goods in Utah. U.C.A. § 70A-1-106 mandates liberal 
administration of remedies in order to make deserving victims of breach whole: "The remedies 
provided by this act shall be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put 
in as good a position as if the other party had fully performed. . . ." 
The Code specifically provides for compensatory remedies for aggrieved buyers in U.C.A. 
§ 70A-2-711(1): u[T]he buyer may . . . in addition to recovering so much of the price as has 
been paid. . . (b) recover damages for nondelivery as provided in this chapter (Section 70A-2-
713)." 
Utah Code Annotated § 70A-2-713 then provides for expectational damages in the event 
of a seller's breach: 
Subject to the provisions of this chapter with respect to proof of market price 
(section 70A-2-723), the measure of damages for nondelivery or repudiation by 
the seller is the difference between the market price at the time when the buyer 
learned of the breach and the contract price together with any incidental and 
consequential damages provided in this chapter (Section 70A-2-715), but less 
expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach. 
Incidental damages, pursuant to U.C.A. § 70A-2-715(l) "include expenses reasonably 
incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, 
any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection with effecting cover 
and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or other breach" 
According to the UCC, Mr. Jonsson is entitled to recover (1) the amount he paid 
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Defendants under the contract for the goods he did not receive, (2) the difference between the 
market and contract prices for the goods, and (3) incidental damages he has incurred as a result of 
his performance under the breached contract. 
1. Mr. Jonsson paid Defendants $8,000 under the contract for the feed truck, the generator, 
the switching unit, the electrical panels, and the wiring. Johnson then took possession of the feed 
truck, but never received the rest of the equipment. Thus, the Court will account for the portion 
of the contract as to which Defendants have performed and deduct such amount from the total 
contract price of $8,000 for all of the goods. 
Testimony at trial was that Mr. Powell purchased 2 feed trucks from Mr. Bromley for 
$4200.00. One of Reed Bromley's feed trucks is thus worth $2100. Thus, for the portions of the 
contract which Defendants did not perform, Mr. Jonsson is entitled to recover $5,900 ($8,000 
minus $2100). 
2. Expert testimony at trial indicated that a similar used generator would sell for between 
$24,000 and $35,000, according to Richard Mitchell and Jim Yates respectively. Mr. Mitchell 
also testified that a similar switching unit would cost $6,000 to $8,000. The Court determines the 
market value of the generator to be $30,000 and the market value of the switching unit to be 
$8,000. Based on the testimony of Reed Bromley as to his efforts to sell the panels, the Court 
determines that the electrical panels were of little or no monetary value. Thus, the difference 
between market value and contract price for the goods that Mr. Jonsson did not receive is 
$38,000. 
3. Mr. Jonsson's incidental damages include the cost to Mr. Jonsson of Mr. Mitchell's 
inspection and disconnection. Mr. Jonsson forgave Mr. Mitchell a $2500 debt in lieu of 
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Mitchell's disconnection services that he performed on the Bromley property. Thus, Mr. Jonsson 
is entitled to recover $2500 in incidental damages Although the evidence indicates that Mr. 
Jonsson spent $132 on a battery for the generator, Mr. Jonsson presented no evidence that he 
attempted to mitigate or reduce the $132 in damages by making any efforts to return or to resell 
the battery. Thus, the Court will not include the battery's cost of $132 as incidental damages to 
which Mr. Jonsson is entitled to recover. 
V 
Based upon the evidence provided, the Court does not find the actions of the Defendants 
to be willful, wanton, or malicious, and does therefore not find sufficient evidence to grant 
punitive damages or attorney's fees to Mr. Jonsson. 
CONCLUSION 
In summary, judgment may be entered against Defendants, Reed Bromley and Utah Valley 
Egg and Poultry, Inc., whom the Court shall hold jointly and severally liable, in the amount of 
$46,400 (which is the total of $5,900 + $38,000 + $2500), which sum is to be paid to the 
Plaintiff, Keith Jonsson. The claims against Bromley Farms are dismissed. Counsel for the 
Plaintiff shall prepare appropriate findings and judgment consistent with this Memorandum 
Decision and submit them to the Court for signature 
DATED this ! *h day of \/hS^ , 1999, 
^'7 BY THE COURT 
'N 
I" Is 
GARYBTeSTOTT 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF UTAH COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
* * * * * * * 
KEITH JONSSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
REED BROMLEY AND BROMLEY 
FARMS, a Utah corporation, and UTAH 
VALLEY EGG & POULTRY, INC., a Utah 
corporation 
Defendants. 
DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF 
OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED 
JUDGMENT 
Case No. 970400247 
Judge Gary Stott 
* * * * * * * 
Pursuant to Rule 4-504(2) of the Utah Rules of Judicial Administration, 
defendants Reed Bromley and Utah Valley Egg and Poultry, Inc., respectfully submit this Notice 
of Objections to the proposed judgment prepared by plaintiffs counsel. 
293709 1 
C\9S\{) 
I. The Award Mistakenly Grants Plaintiff a Double-Recovery on His 
Claim For Breach of Contract. 
In the Memorandum Decision of September 13, 1999, the Court identified the appropriate 
measure of damages in this contract dispute to be: (i) recovery of so much of the price as has 
been paid, plus (ii) the difference between the market price and the contract price, together with 
(iii) any incidental and consequential damages. Memorandum Decision at 6-7. 
The Court found that the contract price of $5,900 had been paid. It then found that the 
market price of the goods was $38,000. Finally, it found that the plaintiff had $2,500 in 
incidental and consequential damages. On that basis, the Court concluded that a judgment may 
be entered in the amount of "$46,400 (which is the total of $5,900 + $38,000 + $2,500)". 
Memorandum Decision at 7-8. 
Yet the amount of $38,000 used by the Court in its calculation is incorrect. $38,000 is, in 
the Court's view, the market price of the goods. The figure which should have been used, the 
difference between market price and contract price, is $32,100 (which is the difference between 
$38,000 and $5,900). Under the Court's announced damages rale, the proper calculation of 
damages would be $40,100 (which is the total of $5,900 + $32,100 + $2,500). 
II. Prejudgment Interest is Inappropriate in This Case Because the Award 
Represents a "Best Estimate" of the Goods' Value. 
The proposed judgment includes an award of prejudgment interest that was not included 
in the Court's Memorandum Decision, and is improper in this case. Under Utah law, an award of 
prejudgment interest is inappropriate if damages cannot be determined with mathematical 
precision. Price Orem Investment Co. v. Rollins, Brown & Gunnel Inc.. 784 P.2d 475, 482-83 
293709.1 
(Utah Ct. App. 1989) ("For damages to be calculable with mathematical certainty, they must be 
ascertained 'in accordance with fixed rules of evidence and known standards of value . . . rather 
than be guided by [the factfinder's] best judgment in assessing the amount to be allowed for past 
as well as future injury, or for elements that cannot be measured by any fixed standards of 
value." (affirming trial court's denial of prejudgment interest on damage award based on expert 
testimony regarding fair market value) (quoting Fell v. Union Pacific Rv. Co., 32 Utah 101, 88 P. 
1003, 1005 (Utah 1907)). As the Court's Memorandum Decision makes plain, the award of 
damages on plaintiffs claim was not determined with mathematical precision, but instead based 
on the Court's best judgment of the goods' value as gleaned from purported expert testimony 
regarding what a similar used generator and switching unit would sell for. Memorandum 
Decision at 7. 
Defendants respectfully request that the Court revise the proposed judgment in 
conformity with the Court's award of damages as announced in its Memorandum Decision. 
DATED this 7th day of October, 1999. 
&U~YMM[1—• 
J. THOMAS BECKETT 
ELLEN KITZMILLER 
PARSONS BEHLE & LATIMER 
Attorneys for Defendants 
293709.1 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that on this 7th day of October, 1999,1 caused to be mailed, first 
class, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANTS' NOTICE OF 
OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED JUDGMENT to: 
Mark C. McLachlan 
Perkins, Schwobe & McLachlan 
343 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Mark C McLachlan (#2207) 
PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
343 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 521-0177 
FILED 
hourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County, State of Utah 
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KEITH JONS SON, 
Plaintiff 
vs 
REED BROMLEY AND BROMLEY 
FARMS, a Utah Corporation, and UTAH 
VALLEY EGG & POULTRY, INC , 
a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Case No 970400247 CV 
Judge GaryD Stott 
This matter on came on for trial before the Honorable Gary D Stott on the 7th day of 
September, 1999 The Plaintiff, Keith M Jonsson being present and represented by his attorney, 
Mark C McLachlan of Perkins, Schwobe and McLachlan and the Defendants, Reed Bromley and 
Utah Valley Egg & Poultry, Inc , being present and represented by their attorneys of record, Ellen 
Kitzmiller and Thomas Beckett of Parson Behle and Latimer and the Court having fully reviewed 
the file and having considered all of the evidence presented at the trial and having here before 
entered it's Memorandum Decision, now makes and enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Utah County, State of Utah. 
2. Defendant, Reed Bromley is a resident of Utah County, State of Utah. 
3. Defendant, Utah Valley Egg & Poultry, Inc. is a Utah Corporation and at all times 
material hereto was doing business in Utah County, State of Utah. 
4. Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Section 78-3-4, Utah Code Annotated. 
5. Venue is proper pursuant to Section 78-13-4, Utah Code Annotated. 
6. The Plaintiff, Keith Jonsson offered Defendants, Reed Bromley and Utah Valley Egg & 
Poultry, Inc., a total of Eight Thousand ($8,000.00) Dollars for the purchase of their feed truck, 
generator, switching unit, electrical panels and wiring, as described in Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. 
7. That Douglas Powell delivered Mr. Jonsson's offer to Defendants on March 4, 1996 in 
the form of written documents that Plaintiff Jonsson had prepared, which document was admitted 
as Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 at the trial. 
8. That although Reed Bromley testified he did not sign Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, but instead 
that his Father, Michael Bromley signed the document, the Court finds that Reed Bromley 
accepted Mr. Jonsson's check in the amount of Eight Thousand ($8,000) Dollars and deposited it 
the next day, and never told anyone connected to the transaction, including Keith Jonsson, 
Richard Mitchell (Mr. Jonsson's electrician), Brandon Woods (Mr. Mitchell's assistant 
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electrician), Douglas Powell, or Steve Bell, representative of Utah Power & Light, that he 
disputed or was not in agreement with the document that Reed Bromley testified his Father had 
signed. 
9. Although Reed Bromley testified that he had not intended to sell the electrical panels, 
and that he told Mr. Powell, Mr. Mitchell, Mr. Woods and Mr. Bell, all individuals who were 
present at the Bromley Farm for the purpose of disconnecting and removing Jonsson's equipment, 
that the electrical panels were not included in the deal with Mr. Jonsson; the Court finds the 
testimonies of Douglas Powell, Richard Mitchell and Darin Woods are consistent, and that Mr. 
Bromley never mentioned to them that the electrical panels were to be excluded from what Mr. 
Jonsson was buying. 
10. Reed Bromley made no personal effort to contact Mr. Jonsson to tell Mr. Jonsson 
that despite the fact that he was accepting Mr. Jonsson's offer and check, he was excluding the 
electrical panels from the sale, and the Court finds that all items described in the Plaintiffs Exhibit 
1 were included in the agreement between Mr. Jonsson and the Defendants, Reed Bromley and 
Utah Valley Egg & Poultry, Inc. 
11. Mr. Bromley deposited the check in his own personal account and used the funds for 
his own personal or business needs. 
12. The Court finds that Mr. Jonsson, after receiving the signed document and being 
notified that Reed Bromley had accepted his check, acted reasonable and promptly in contacting 
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Alvin Ault to go with him to personally inspect the equipment. Further, Mr. Jonsson acted 
reasonably and promptly in contacting Richard Mitchell to go to the farm to inspect the 
equipment and to disconnect and remove the equipment; and therefore complied with the terms of 
Plaintiffs', Exhibit 1. 
13. In late May or early June of 1996, Mr. Jonsson sent Mr. Mitchell to disconnect and 
pick up all of the remaining items that Mr. Jonsson had purchased from the Bromley's farm. At 
this meeting, Mr Woods, Mr. Mitchell, and Mr. Bell of Utah Power and Light were present at the 
Bromley's farm to assist Mr. Mitchell in effecting a safe disconnection of the generator and 
switching equipment. During this visit, Reed Bromley was also present with Mr. Mitchell, Mr. 
Woods, and Mr. Bell and at Reed Bromley's request, the parties then agreed that the pick up of 
the items identified in the agreement, except the feed truck, would be delayed. 
14. The Court finds that during the meeting referred to in the preceding paragraph, a 
telephone conversation took place from the farm to Mr. Jonsson, and Mr. Jonsson and Mr. 
Bromley agreed to allow the items to remain at the Bromley farm, in order to give Mr. Reed 
Bromley electrical power to his sheds, thus allowing him the opportunity to sell some egg 
processing equipment and also in order to avoid turning off an electrical power source to the 
house where Michael Bromley, Reed Bromley's Father lived. 
15. The parties also agreed per this telephone conversation, that the equipment would be 
picked up and removed "before the snow flew." Reed Bromley admitted to this agreement on the 
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record during his testimony 
16 The Court finds that Mr Jonsson made a reasonable effort to contact Reed Bromley 
to pick up the equipment 
17 The Court finds no unreasonable delay on Mr Jonsson's part in checking out the 
equipment by a qualified person or in making arrangements to have the equipment picked up 
18 The Court finds in light of all the circumstances and the evidence surrounding the 
proposal of the agreement by Keith Jonsson to Reed Bromley, and considering Reed Bromley's 
actions in either signing the agreement or accepting the signature of his Father on the document, 
and accepting and depositing Mr Jonsson's check without personally contacting Mr Jonsson to 
inform him of any disagreement as to the electrical panels, that Mr Jonsson met his burden of 
proof in establishing that he made an offer to purchase certain personal property and that Reed 
Bromley ultimately accepted the offer, individually and on behalf of Utah Valley Egg Corporation, 
without repudiating, rescinding, or modifying the agreement as set forth in Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 
19 The Court finds there was a meeting of the minds and an understanding as to what 
was being sold and purchased, and there was an agreement to buy and sell the personal property 
as reflected in the written document, Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 
20 Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 is a binding document on the Plaintiff, Mr Jonsson, to purchase 
and on the Defendants, Reed Bromley and Utah Valley Egg, Inc , to sell the items included in the 
document for the price indicated The Court further finds that Defendants Reed Bromley, acting 
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individually, and Reed Bromley, acting on behalf of Utah Valley Egg, Inc., breached the 
agreement with the Plaintiff, Mr. Jonsson. 
21. The Court further finds that Reed Bromley falsely represented to Mr. Jonsson in 
October of 1996 that Michael Bromley had taken Mr. Jonsson's generator and switching unit to 
Salt Lake City to be serviced for Mr. Jonsson; however, Reed Bromley had actually sold the 
generator and switching unit to a third party. The Court further finds that Reed Bromley had 
given this false information about the generator to Mr. Jonsson, and after Mr. Jonsson discovered 
that Reed Bromley had sold the equipment, and the Court further finds that Mr. Jonsson acted 
reasonably and timely to determine the value of the property by finding out, at Reed Bromley's 
request, what it would cost to replace the generator and switching unit, and in communicating 
such price to Reed Bromley. 
22. The Court finds that Reed Bromley represented to Mr. Jonsson that if Mr. Jonsson 
would find out the replacement cost of the generator and the switching unit, he would replace 
such equipment, which Reed Bromley admitted he had wrongfully sold. 
23. The Court finds that Reed Bromley would not speak with Mr. Jonsson after Mr. 
Jonsson had informed Reed Bromley of the replacement cost of the generator and switching unit. 
24. Considering all the circumstances and the evidence surrounding the attempted pick up 
of the equipment by Mr. Jonsson, Reed Bromley's request that some equipment remain, Reed 
Bromley's misrepresentations to Mr. Jonsson, and Reed Bromley's sale of the equipment, which 
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Mr Jonsson had purchased, to a third party, the Court concludes that Defendants Reed Bromley 
and Utah Valley Egg & Poultry, Inc breached their contract with the Plaintiff, Mr Jonsson , as to 
the sale of goods described in Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, minus the feed truck, of which Mr Jonsson has 
possession 
25 The Court finds that Defendants Reed Bromley and Utah Valley Egg & Poultry, Inc 
are held jointly and severally liable for the damages that Mr Jonsson suffered as a result of their 
breach 
26 The Court finds that Defendant Reed Bromley acted both individually and on behalf 
of his corporation, Utah Valley Egg & Poultry, Inc , when he was dealing with Mr Jonsson in this 
transaction 
27 The contract between Plaintiff and Defendant is marked as Plaintiffs Exhibit 1, and 
was admitted into evidence 
28. Reed Bromley, as to the corporate entity of Utah Valley Egg & Poultry, Inc was its 
sole shareholder and its only officer and, Reed Bromley held himself out individually to Mr 
Jonsson and to Mr Jonsson's agents to be the owner of the property described in Plaintiffs 
Exhibit 1 until the filing of this lawsuit, after which he then claimed that Utah Valley Egg & 
Poultry, Inc owned the property 
29 There was no evidence at trial to indicate that Bromley Farms was a viable 
corporation when the parties entered the agreement To the contrary, the evidence indicated that 
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on March 4, 1996, Bromley Farms was not the owner of the personal property involved in the 
transaction to Mr. Jonsson. 
30. The Court finds that Reed Bromley treated Utah Valley Egg & Poultry, Inc as his 
alter ego. Thus, to correctly include the owners of the property, and to prevent an injustice, the 
Court holds Reed Bromley and Utah Valley Egg & Poultry, Inc. jointly and severally liable for 
damages in this case. 
31. The Court finds that Mr. Jonsson paid Defendants Eight Thousand ($8,000) Dollars 
under the contract for the feed truck, the generator, the switching unit, the electrical panels, and 
the wiring. 
32. Jonsson then took possession of the feed truck, but never received the rest of the 
equipment. Thus, the Court will account for the portion of the contract as to which Defendants 
have performed and deduct such amount from the total contract price for all of the goods. 
33. The Court finds that Mr. Powell purchased two (2) feed trucks from Mr. Bromley for 
$4,200.00. One of Reed Bromley's feed trucks is thus worth $2,100.00. Thus, for the portions 
of the contract which Defendants did not perform, Mr. Jonsson is entitled to recover $5,900 
($8,000 minus $2,100). 
34. The Court finds that expert testimony at the trial indicated that a similar used 
generator would sell for between $24,000 and $35,000, according to Richard Mitchell and Jim 
Yates respectively. Mr. Mitchell also testified that a similar switching unit would cost $6,000 to 
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$8,000. The Court determines the market value of the generator to be $30,000 and the market 
value of the switching unit to be $8,000. 
35. Based upon the testimony of Reed Bromley, the Court finds that the electrical panels 
were of little or no monetary value. Thus, the difference between market value and contract price 
for the goods that Mr. Jonsson did not receive is $38,000. 
36. The Court finds that Mr. Jonsson's incidental damages include the cost to Mr. 
Jonsson of Mr. Mitchell's inspection of the generator and disconnection of the generator. Mr. 
Jonsson forgave Mr. Mitchell a $2,500 debt in lieu of Mr. Mitchells' disconnection services that 
he performed on the Bromley property. Thus, Mr. Jonsson is entitled to recover $2,500 in 
incidental damages. 
37. The Court finds that the cost of a battery purchased by Mr. Jonsson in the amount of 
$132 as incidental damages which is not recoverable, because Mr. Jonsson did not attempt to 
mitigate his damages for the battery. 
38. Based upon all the evidence provided, the Court does not find the actions of the 
Defendants to be willful, wanton, or malicious, and does therefore not find sufficient evidence to 
grant punitive damages or attorneys's fees to Mr. Jonsson. 
39 The Court finds that Plaintiff Keith Jonsson is entitled to recover prejudgment interest 
resulting from the breach of contract pursuant to U.C.A. § 15-l-(2). 
40. The Court finds that Plaintiff Keith Jonsson is entitled to recover his costs in the 
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amount of Six Hundred ($600) Dollars, and that such costs were necessarily incurred and are 
reasonable. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters it's: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. The Court concludes in light of all the circumstances and the evidence surrounding the 
proposal of the agreement by Keith Jonsson to Reed Bromley, and considering Reed Bromley's 
actions in either signing the agreement or accepting the signature of his Father, Michael Bromley 
on the agreement (Exhibit 1), and accepting and depositing Mr. Jonsson's check without 
personally contacting Mr. Jonsson to inform him of any disagreement as to the electrical panels, 
that Mr. Jonsson met his burden of proof in establishing that he made an offer to purchase certain 
personal property and that Reed Bromley ultimately accepted the offer, individually and on behalf 
of Utah Valley Egg Corporation, without repudiating, rescinding, or modifying the agreement as 
contained in Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. 
2. The Court finds there was a meeting of the minds and an understanding as to what was 
being sold and purchased, and there was an agreement to buy and sell the personal property as 
contained in the written document, Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. 
3. Plaintiffs Exhibit 1 is a binding agreement on the Plaintiff, Mr. Jonsson, to purchase 
and on the Defendants, Reed Bromley and Utah Valley Egg, Inc., to sell the items included in the 
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document for the price indicated. The Court fiirther finds that Defendants Reed Bromley, acting 
individually and on behalf of Utah Valley Egg & Poultry, Inc., breached the agreement with the 
Plaintiff, Mr. Jonsson. 
4. Reed Bromley acting individually and as an alter ego of Utah Valley Egg & Poultry, 
Inc., entered into an agreement with Plaintiff Keith Jonsson, which agreement is identified as 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 1. 
5. That Reed Bromley and Utah Valley Egg & Poultry, Inc., breached the agreement with 
Mr. Jonsson. 
6. Utah has specifically adopted the Uniform Commercial Code, in U.C.A. §§ 70A-1-101 
et seq, to govern the sale of goods in Utah. U.C.A. § 70A-1-106 mandates liberal administration 
of remedies in order to make deserving victims of breach whole: "The remedies provided by this 
act shall be liberally administered to the end that the aggrieved party may be put in as good a 
position as if the other party had gully performed. . ." 
The Code specifically provides for compensatory remedies for aggrieved buyers in U.C.A. 
§70A-2-711(1): u[T]he buyer may. . . in addition to recovering so much of the price as has been 
paid. . . (b) recover damages for non delivery as provided in this chapter (Section 70A-2-713)." 
Utah Code Annotated § 70A-2-713 then provides for expectational damages in the event 
of a seller's breach: 
Subject to the provisions of this chapter with respect to proof of 
market price (section 70A-2-723), the measure of damages for 
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nondelivery or repudiation by the seller is the difference between 
the market price at the time when the buyer learned of the breach 
and the contract price together with any incidental and 
consequential damages provided in this chapter (Section 70A-2-
715), but less expenses saved in consequence of the seller's breach 
Incidental damages, pursuant to U C A § 70A-2-715(l) "include expenses reasonably 
incurred in inspection, receipt, transportation and care and custody of goods rightfully rejected, 
any commercially reasonable charges, expenses or commissions in connection with effecting cover 
and any other reasonable expense incident to the delay or other breach" 
According to the UCC, Mr Jonsson is entitled to recover (1) the amount he paid 
Defendants under the contract for the goods he did not receive, (2) the difference between the 
market and contract prices for the goods, and (3) incidental damages he has incurred as a result of 
his performance under the breached contract 
7 Accordingly, Plaintiff Keith Jonsson is entitled to a judgment against the Defendants, 
Reed Bromley and Utah Valley Egg & Poultry, Inc , jointly and severally in the amount of Forty-
Six Thousand Four Hundred ($46,400) Dollars (which is the total of $5,900 (amount paid less 
value of feed truck) + $38,000 (value of generator and switching unit) + $2,500 (sum paid to 
Richard Mitchell), together with interest thereon at the legal rate of 10% per annum from 
November 14, 1996 through the present, pursuant to Section 15-l-(2) Utah Code Annotated 
($13,533), together with Plaintiffs costs in the amount of Six Hundred ($600) Dollars 
8 The claims against Bromley Farms are dismissed with prejudice 
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DATED this / ^ day of October, 1999. 
BY THE COURT 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, were hand delivered, this _3 P day of September 1999, to the 
following: 
J. Thomas Beckett 
Ellen Kitzmiller 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
Attorneys for Defendants 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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Tab 5 
Mark C. McLachlan (#2207) 
PERKINS, SCHWOBE & McLACHLAN 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
343 South 400 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone (801) 521-0177 
IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR 
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KEITH JONSSON, : 
Plaintiff 
JUDGMENT 
vs. : 
REED BROMLEY AND : Case No: 970400247 CV 
BROMLEY FARMS, : 
a Utah Corporation, and UTAH : Judge: Gary D. Stott 
VALLEY EGG & POULTRY, INC., : 
a Utah Corporation: 
Defendants : 
This matter having come on for trial before the Honorable Gary D. Stott, on the 7th day of 
September, 1999, the Plaintiff Keith M. Jonsson being present and represented by his attorney, 
Mark C. McLachlan of Perkins, Schwobe and McLachlan and the Defendants Reed Bromley and 
Utah Valley Egg & Poultry, Inc., being present and represented by their attorneys, Ellen 
KitzmiUer and Thomas Beckett of Parsons, Behle and Latimer and the Court having considered all 
of the evidence presented at trial and having entered it's Memorandum Decision, Findings of Fact 
and Conclusions of Law, now enters it's Judgment as follows: 
Plaintiff Keith Jonsson is hereby awarded a Judgment against Defendants, Reed Bromley 
and Utah Valley Egg & Poultry, Inc., jointly and severally, in the amount of Forty Six Thousand 
Four Hundred ($46,400) Dollars, plus prejudgment interest in the amount of Thirteen Thousand 
Five Hundred and Thirty-Three ($13,533) Dollars, plus Plaintiffs costs incurred herein in the 
amount of Six Hundred ($600.00) Dollars, for a total Judgment of Sixty Thousand Five Hundred 
and Thirty-Three ($60,533) Dollars, such Judgment bearing interest at the rate of 6.545% until 
paid. 
DATED this / g day of October, 1999. 
BY THE COURT 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of the foregoing Judgment was hand 
delivered, this day of September 1999, to the following: 
J. Thomas Beckett 
Ellen Kitzmiller 
Parsons Behle & Latimer 
Attorneys for Defendants 
201 South Main Street, Suite 1800 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
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